The Future of Governmental Ethics: Law and Morality by Mills, Jon L.
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 17
Number 3 Dickinson Journal of International Law Article 2
5-1-1999
The Future of Governmental Ethics: Law and
Morality
Jon L. Mills
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation




The Future of Governmental Ethics:
Law and Morality
Jon L. Mills*
Based on a speech presented at the 16th International
Symposium on Economic Crime, Cambridge University, England
September 13-19, 1998.
I. Introduction ................................ 407
II. What is Ethical Conduct? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
III. How is Ethical Conduct Achieved in the United States?409
A. Tools of Democracy ....................... 410
B. Political and Constitutional Structures .......... 410
C. Ethics Legislation ......................... 411
1. Abuse of Office ........................ 411
2. Conflicts of Interest in Public Decision-Making
and Their Disclosure .................... 411
a) G ifts .............................. 412
b) Financial Holdings and Employment ...... 413
* Jon Mills, J.D., is a Professor of Law at the University of Florida and the
Director of the Center for Governmental Responsibility, Florida's first legal and
public-policy research center. He is a former Speaker of the Florida House of
Representatives, where he served for ten years, and he was a member of the 1997-
1998 State of Florida Constitution Revision Commission.
The author wishes to thank Craig Goodmark, Michael Moore, Alejandro Soto,
Lisa Moore, and Clyde LaForest, without whose assistance in research, writing,
and editing, this publication would not have been possible.
406 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:3
3. Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance
R eform .............................. 413
4. Creation of Institutions that Oversee Ethics . . . 414
5. The Appearance of Impropriety ............ 416
IV. Elements That Discourage Corruption ............ 419
A. Brazil .................................. 419
B. South Africa's Unique Position ............... 421
C. Central and Eastern Europe's New Dilemma ..... 422
V. W hat is Lacking? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
VI. Conclusion ................................. 426
A ppendix A ................................ 428
A uthorities ................................. 432
LAW AND MORALITY
I. Introduction
The topic of ethics in government is hardly new, and yet it is
far from maturity. From the Greek democracy of antiquity to the
fledgling democracies of the current day, we have struggled to
maintain morality and ethics in the governance of our societies and
have failed to perfect a method. But that does not, and should not,
prevent professors from trying. As Mark Twain once quipped, "To
do good is noble, but to teach others how to be good is no-
bler-and no trouble."' It is always easier to tell others how to
behave than to do so.
When we try to define character and ethics in public office, it
may be easier to define corrupt actions than to define ethical
conduct. Consequently, striving for ethical governance often entails
determining what is bad conduct and then encouraging a less easily
definable good conduct.
At least some of the difficulty lies in the tangle of consider-
ations confronting the public official's decision-making in a
democracy-the multiple duties, values, constitutions, and ethics
codes. Equality, liberty, freedom of speech-although we profess
these to be among our guiding lights, anyone who has been in
public service any length of time knows that looking to general
principles and values will not generate practical policy answers.
And while citizens want integrity, honesty, and character in their
public officials, even honest persons of integrity can reach different
policy conclusions.
Though a positivist approach to ethics in governance currently
prevails in the United States, the allure of black-letter rules of
morality may just be the primary source of our present difficulty in
maintaining truly ethical governance. Some believe modern ethics
rules actually deter people of good character from government
service and encourage those already "in the system" to care more
about fastidiously complying with the rulebook, or at least the
appearance thereof, than serving the public interest. The question
remains, then: What role should ethics regulation play in a
democracy?
1. MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR FLYLEAF (1897), quoted in
PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN H. REYNOLDS, THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRI-
ETY: HOW THE ETHICS WARS HAVE UNDERMINED AMERICAN GOVERNMENT,
BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY 73 (1997).
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II. What is Ethical Conduct?
Any hope for a perfectly ethical government, arising from a
utopian ideal of self-governance, is unrealistic and defies both the
lessons of history and the reality of human nature. Thus, our goal
should be to encourage, foster, and promote ethical public service
to the highest degree possible, given the tools of democracy.
Conceding that one's concept of ethics will vary from person to
person, we first must look for some logical point of departure.
There is some agreement on what is legally ethical. For
instance, two particular sins that are generally considered morally
and legally wrong-the corrupt abuse of public office for private
gain and the preservation of conflicts of interest in public decision-
making. Moving from this point of common understanding, the
current focus of laws in the United States can be placed into the
following six categories:
1. Prohibiting abuse of office. Such laws bar government
officials from using the power of their offices for improper
purposes. We might generally define this category of conduct
as corruption.2
2. Controlling conflicts of interest. A conflict of interest
implies that motivations other than the public good affect an
official's decisions. These laws define, prohibit, or require the
reporting of conflicts.3
3. Requiring disclosure of private interests. Discouraging, or
at the very least identifying, conflicts of interest is another
method of deterring wrongful behavior. 4
2. See, e.g., Standards for conduct of public officers, employees of agencies,
and local government attorneys, FLA. STAT. § 112.313 (1997), at (6) (misuse of
public position); Gordon v. Commission on Ethics, 609 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1992)
(holding that a city commission member violated section 112.313(6) of the Florida
Statutes when he used city stationery to promote a symposium for which he
received compensation).
3. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 112.313(7) (conflicting employment or contractual
relationship); Zerweck v. Commission on Ethics, 409 So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (holding that a city commission member's employment as a development
coordinator with a proprietary business, which caused recurring conflicts of
interest, violated section 112.313(7) of the Florida Statutes).
4. See, e.g., Disclosure of financial interests and clients represented before
agencies, FLA. STAT. § 112.3145 (1997); Goldtrap v. Askew, 334 So. 2d 20 (Fla.
1976) (holding that a county commission member, as a "public officer," had a duty
to file a financial disclosure as required by section 112.3145 of the Florida Statutes
because the statute did not violate his right to privacy); infra Appendix A, at § IV.
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4. Regulating campaign financing. These laws attempt to
attenuate the impact of private campaign contributions and
lobbying activities on the official's decision-making.5
5. Restricting activities that create an appearance of impropri-
ety.
6
6. Creating institutions to oversee ethics.7
Each of these areas will be discussed below as a component of
the attempt to define ethical governance as a matter of law.
III. How is Ethical Conduct Achieved in the United States?
Three broad considerations may guide an evaluation of ethical
governance: 1) The quality and enforceability of ethics laws; 2) the
qualities of the governing system which deter corrupt conduct; and
3) the ability of the governing system to attract ethical individuals
as public servants.
In the United States, the modern focus on governmental ethics
began with the Watergate scandal of the early 1970s. That era
spawned ethics commissions in virtually every state as well as the
U.S. Office of Government Ethics.' Multiple laws aimed at
prohibiting conflicts of interest and requiring disclosure of gifts,
contributions, personal income, and net worth were promptly
enacted.9 Despite these efforts, the people of the United States
now maintain one of the lowest levels of trust in their public
servants throughout the nation's history."i
However, even if public ethics are currently held in low regard
in the United States, its system of constitutional democracy is well
designed to deter corruption. Indeed, competitive free elections,
free speech, aggressive citizen oversight, and an independent
judiciary-what might be called the tools of democracy-are the
5. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(b) ("All elected public officers and
candidates for such offices shall file full and public disclosure of their campaign
finances."); Campaign financing, limitations on contributions, FLA. STAT. § 106.08
(1997).
6. See, e.g., Zerweck, 409 So. 2d at 60 (reasoning that a primary objective of
Florida's Code of Ethics is avoiding the appearance of impropriety).
7. See, e.g., Commission on Ethics; purpose, FLA. STAT. § 112.320 (1997)
("There is created a Commission on Ethics, the purpose of which is to serve as
guardian of the standards of conduct for the officers and employees of the
state ... and to serve as the independent commission provided for in s. 8(f), Art.
II of the State Constitution.").
8. See Title IV of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521,
92 Stat. 1855-62 (1978) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 401-408 (1994)).
9. See, e.g., infra Appendix A.
10. See MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 40.
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primary characteristics of the American system deterring corrup-
tion.
A. Tools of Democracy
Democracy, that is a representative government chosen by its
citizens, has the inherent ability to provide the elements of a
governmental system necessary to combat corruption. Thus, Philip
Heymann has noted, "The more a government is responsive to its
citizens' wishes, the more likely the agents of government will feel
a counterbalance to the temptations of corruption."''
Yet democracy per se is not a panacea. Freedom and liberty,
forming the foundation of democracy, are the source from which
flow the tools used to minimize the ability of governmental leaders
to engage in unethical behavior. 2 Specifically, frequent elections,
political competition, separate and independent branches of
government, and independent institutions of vigilance are the
essential components of a democratic system that discourages
corruption in government. 3
When a governmental system becomes corrupt, its authority
and control are jeopardized by the concomitant loss of popular
support. While established democracies are unlikely to crumble
following discoveries of corruption, infant democracies may not
survive. 4  Ironically, in that unstable transitional setting, a
replacement government may be just as corrupt as its predecessor.
Of three countries that recently have shifted to democratic
systems-namely, Brazil, South Africa, and Poland-all have been
burdened by corrupt practices and have enacted measures to
counter them. The situation in each country is distinct and will be
further addressed in section IV.
B. Political and Constitutional Structures
When a public servant seeks some moral epistle, the law might
well be the first stop. When defining what is legally unethical,
11. Philip B. Heymann, Democracy and Corruption, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.
323, 329 (1996).
12. See id.
13. See id. at 334; accord Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Democracy,
90 AM. Soc'Y L. PROC. 83, 90 (1996) ("A democratic electoral system, standing
alone, is an insufficient deterrent to corruption. Also important are vigorous
outside checks, a division of power within the state and enforcement of the rule
of law in commercial and political life.").
14. See Heymann, supra note 11, at 327.
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lawmakers have distinguished between the different types of public
officials. That is, there are different ethical codes for the judicial
branch, for the executive or administrative branch, and for the
legislative branch.
C. Ethics Legislation
As mentioned earlier, ethics legislation and regulations
generally target abuse of office, conflicts of interest in public
decision-making, unknown private concerns, and campaign finance.
1. Abuse of Office-It is recorded that the sculptor commis-
sioned under public contract to create the great sculpture of
Athena in the Parthenon was indicted for misuse of office because
he adorned the goddess' shield with his own image.15 This
particular corrupt act was not difficult to prove, and, unfortunately,
such obvious misconduct continues in modern times.
Not long ago, for instance, a county commissioner in northeast-
ern Florida used county road-grading equipment to repair roads to
his watermelon fields and county trucks and county road personnel
to load his watermelons and transport them to market.a6 Reacting
swiftly, the Florida Ethics Commission concluded that he had
clearly abused his office. 7 While these examples of misconduct
appear to be self-evident, finding an abuse of office typically
requires a showing of intent," often making it troublesome to
prove this kind of misconduct.
2. Conflicts of Interest in Public Decision-Making and Their
Disclosure- Conflicts of interest include taking public action in
exchange for receiving something of personal value or for gain to
friends or family members. 9 The means used to attack conflicts
of interest include simply making such improperly-motivated acts
criminal or illegal, as well as requiring disclosure of situations such
as receiving gifts, earning income from outside the public office,
15. See PLUTARCH, PERICLES 13:31.
16. See In re Jack Vinson, Fla. Comm'n on Ethics No. 83-08 (1983).
17. See id.
18. See infra Appendix A, at § I.B.
19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 112.313(2) (solicitation or acceptance of gifts);
Voting conflicts, FLA. STAT. § 112.3143 (1997), at (3)(a).
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and owning property (real and personal) 2 that may indicate
conflicts of interest.21
The law in Florida treats various public officials differently.
For example, state officers -including legislators- need not abstain
from voting in the face of certain conflicts;22 they must merely
report it.23 On the other hand, local officials may not vote when
they would receive some "special benefit," and they must publicly
report such an abstention.24
Financial disclosure has been referred to as "the 'linchpin' of
the ethical enforcement system and the 'disinfectant sunlight which
makes possible the cleaning up of abusive practices.' ' 25 Florida
requires public officials to "file full and public disclosure of their
financial interests" in order to uphold what its constitution refers
to as "a public trust., 26 Financial disclosure is a two-tiered system
where reporting individuals comply with either the statutory
financial-disclosure laws or the constitutional "ethics in govern-
21
ment" provision.
a) Gifts.-One action which creates an apparent conflict of
interest is when a public official accepts gifts from those who have
a particular agenda before that official's governmental agency or
body. Many U.S. states have prohibited their public officials from
accepting gifts or have severely limited the value of gifts their
officials may accept.28 The assumption, of course, is that a person
taking inexpensive gifts will not be improperly influenced.
Currently in Florida, public officials are prohibited from accepting
20. See infra Appendix A.
21. See, e.g., Full and public disclosure of financial interests, FLA. STAT.
§ 112.3144 (1997); FLA. STAT. § 112.3145.
22. See FLA. STAT. § 112.3143(2).
23. See id.
24. See FLA. STAT. § 112.3143(3).
25. Ann McBride, Ethics in Congress: Agenda and Action, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 451, 476 (1990) (quoting REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON FED.
ETHICS LAW REFORM, To SERVE WITH HONOR 5 (1989)).
26. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8.
27. See infra Appendix A, at § V.
28. The Council on Governmental Ethics Laws (COGEL), created in 1978,
publishes a compilation of data about existing ethics agencies, which includes
information about statutory and regulatory functions, budgets, and the names of
personnel. See generally BONNIE J. WILLIAMS, COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL
ETHICS LAWS, Ethics Update: 20th Annual Conference (1998) (collecting
information from ethics agencies in the U.S. and Canadian federal, state, and
provincial governments); <http://www.cogel.org>.
LAW AND MORALITY
gifts valued greater than $100, except under specified conditions,
which then must be disclosed.29
An entertaining quirk of Florida law is an exception which
permits officials to accept gifts from relatives.3" This concept, of
course, seems rational: Why should a wife and husband not be
able to exchange gifts without the intervention of state law?3
Gifts of food are also limited in an interesting fashion; the dollar
limit does not apply to that which can be eaten at one sitting.32
b) Financial Holdings and Employment-Given that public
officials frequently exercise discretion in the performance of their
duties, they are susceptible to charges of making decisions that
favor some private interest. This dilemma is generally combated
by mandating disclosure of the public official's personal interests
and by prohibiting participation in particular cases of decisions.
33
3. Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance Re-
form-According to the Supreme Court of the United States,
"[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the
only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far
identified for restricting campaign finances., 31 Clearly, one goal
of campaign finance reform is to guard against the "buying" of
elected officials. The Court also noted that campaign contributions
differ only slightly from the common bribe.35 If, however, that is
the case, then why do campaign-finance laws permit contributions
at all? The answer lies in the dimension of free speech (i.e.,
29. See infra Appendix A, at §§ II.C., II.D.
30. See Reporting and prohibited receipt of gifts ... , FLA. STAT. § 112.3148
(1997), at (1).
31. The legal definition of "relatives" for this purpose includes, among others,
those who are engaged to be married to the official and "any other natural person
having the same legal residence as the public officer or employee." Definitions,
FLA. STAT. § 112.312 (1997), at (21); accord "Relative" defined, RULES OF THE
FLA. COMM'N ON ETHICS § 34-13.260 (1998).
32. See infra Appendix A, at § II.F.
33. See FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3144, 112.3145.
34. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985).
35. See id. at 497. One commentator draws a distinction: Bribery entails the
conferring of unjust enrichment upon the elected official, whereas campaign
contributions are specifically tendered to enhance the official's chances for
election. David A. Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141,148.
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political speech and association) implicated in campaign contribu-
tions, which is protected by the Constitution.36
Others contend that the goal of campaign finance reform is to
insure that every candidate has the same opportunity to participate
in the electoral process. 37 As noted by one scholar, "The core
problem in campaign finance is not corruption in the traditional
sense. Rather, it is how far equity considerations can and should
be carried in a democracy., 38
The final justification for such reforms may simply be to
preserve the appearance of the legitimacy of the democratic system,
if not the real thing itself. The recent trend in political campaigns
seems to have been "he who raises the most money wins."
Ostensibly, then, the power of the constituent's vote has been
replaced by the power of the contributor's dollar. Installing
limitations on campaign contributions provides a tangible response
to the growing suspicions surrounding the electoral process. Given
the looming distrust of government in general, campaign finance
reforms seek to reassure the citizenry that the electoral process has
not been infected.
4. Creation of Institutions that Oversee Ethics -Irrespective of
specific regulatory provisions geared toward ensuring ethical
behavior, just the opposite will persist absent a government's
concomitant ability to enforce them. Clearly, "[w]ithout vigorous
oversight and enforcement, even the best rules can be rendered
meaningless. 39
The first step in effecting actual enforcement is the implemen-
tation of ethics oversight, which requires a measure of accurate
financial disclosure. More importantly, however, the means of
enforcement must exist independent of the institution enforced."n
For example, the use of outside counsel by Congressional Ethics
36. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-29 (declaring that campaign contribu-
tions are protected by the First Amendment but holding that the maximum caps
on contributions enacted in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 did not
unconstitutionally interfere with contributors' freedom of political speech and
association).
37. See Strauss, supra note 35, at 155-56.
38. Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 111, 112.
39. McBride, supra note 25, at 479.
40. See id. at 480.
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Committees has proven to be vital in providing independence and
public credibility to ethical reform."
The significance of structural and political independence for
effective ethical governance was never more apparent than during
the Watergate scandal. In what has come to be known as the
"Saturday Night Massacre," President Richard Nixon exercised
control over the Justice Department in order to hinder prosecution
of several executive officials, including himself." Following
President Nixon's resignation, Congress responded by creating an
Independent Counsel through the Ethics in Government Act of
1978.43 Its purpose was simple-"to '[r]emov[e] politics from the
administration of justice." ' 44  Accordingly, the Independent
Counsel operates free of political and budgetary restraints;
45
however, political independence is not necessarily the same as
political impartiality.
46
In addition to the ethical institutions that oversee the acts of
the federal government, every state has enacted laws providing for
the creation of ethics committees. 47 In Florida, for example, a
Commission on Ethics was created in 1974 to "serve as guardian of
the standards of conduct for the officers and employees of the
state.,4 1 In its role as an independent commission, it has the
power to investigate sworn complaints of violations of Florida's
Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees." And, "[i]n
41. See id. "The 1985 Hastings Center report states that '[t]hroughout most
of American history legislatures have been reluctant to discipline members for
ethical offenses, preferring instead to see the voters weed out blatant corruption
at the polls."' Id. at 478 (quoting HASTINGS CENTER, THE ETHICS OF LEGISLA-
TIVE LIFE 16 (1985)).
42. See MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 75.
43. See Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521,
92 Stat. 1824, 1867-75 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994)).
44. Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administration of Justice:
Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government
Act, 79 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (1990) (quoting Removing Politics From the Administration
of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. I (1974)).
45. See MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 76. The Independent
Counsel is not appointed by the Attorney General. Rather, when appropriate, the
Attorney General must petition the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia for the appointment of an Independent Counsel, who serves until the
investigation and prosecution of the specified matters are complete. See id. at 75-
76.
46. See id. at 77.
47. See supra note 28.
48. FLA. STAT. § 112.320.
49. See Duties and powers of commission, FLA. STAT. § 112.322 (1997).
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the event that a violation or breach is found to have been commit-
ted, the commission shall recommend appropriate action to the
agency or official having power to impose any penalty ....
5. The Appearance of Impropriety-One of the newer
approaches to ethics is not only to punish corruption, conflicts of
interest, and abuse of office, but also to avoid circumstances which
provide even the appearance of impropriety.51 The goal is to
increase public faith and, as some have suggested, avoid tempta-
tion."
However, one must question whether regulating appearances
is a rational and worthwhile undertaking. "The most formal
Appearance of Virtue, when it is only an Appearance, may
perhaps, in very abstracted Considerations, seem to be rather less
commendable than Virtue itself without this Formality; but it will
however be always more commended .... , Accordingly,
commentators have long questioned the logic of exerting efforts to
avoid the appearance of impropriety while actual impropriety
remained extant.54
Over the last two-dozen years, the United States has engaged
in considerable efforts to increase public confidence in institu-
tions-"to secure the public trust"-by creating agencies, enacting
laws, and implementing rules of ethics that stress appearances."
However, the proliferation of such rules, attributed by many to the
Watergate scandal, has done little in the way of bolstering public
confidence in American government. 6
In An Essay on the Knowledge of the Characters of Men,
Henry Fielding attributed corruption in government to the use of
50. FLA. STAT. § 112.322(2)(b).
51. See, e.g., Zerweck v. Commission on Ethics, 409 So. 2d 57, 60 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982) (noting that avoiding the appearance of impropriety is an ethical
norm manifest in Florida's Code of Ethics); Philip Shenon, Helms Prods
Holbrooke and Receives a Concession, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1999, at A10 ("I knew
the law and I was careful to follow it. But I should have been more sensitive,
much more sensitive, to the appearances.").
52. See Zerweck, 409 So. 2d at 60 ("A primary objective of the Code of Ethics
is that government officials avoid recurring situations in which there is a
temptation to place personal gain, economic or otherwise, above the discharge of
their fiduciary duty to the public.").
53. HENRY FIELDING, THE HISTORY OF TOM JONES, A FOUNDLING 615
(Fredson Bowers ed., Wesleyan Univ. Press 1975) (1749), quoted in MORGAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 7.
54. See MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 72.
55. See id. at 1.
56. See id.
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"appearance ethics," charging that it leads officials "to conceal
Vices, [rather] than to cultivate Virtues."57 It should therefore be
of no surprise that public confidence in government has manifested
itself as a level of distrust comparable to that of the Vietnam War
era.58 For example, in 1964, Americans trusted that the govern-
ment would act ethically seventy-six percent of the time. By 1995,
that figure had fallen to twenty-five percent.5 9
So why, in the face of such obvious failure, has the appear-
ance-based approach to ethics regulation persisted in government?
Apparently, it benefits "participants in the system."'6  Conse-
quently, despite its societal disadvantages, the appearance-based
approach appears to be'entrenched in ethical tenets.
61
Indeed, appearance-based ethics in the modern era62 has
become a tool for political operatives who use the rules in an effort
to impeach the opposition simply by alleging improper appearanc-
es.63 This works because, while misconduct is ultimately difficult
to prove, the process of public allegation and the resultant attempt
at denial has an unquestionably debilitating effect on the accused.
For example, in the 1970s several Democrats were elected to office
in this fashion, amid the anti-GOP backlash following Watergate.64
Other beneficiaries of the post-Watergate explosion of such
rules included journalists, interest groups, and ethics consultants.
The Washington Post, for example, "climbed aboard the public-
interest rocket to become the nation's third most important
paper., 65  In the meantime, self-appointed "ethics experts"
profited from the proliferation of new rules and their attendant
ambiguities. 66
As a result of the multiple layers of rules enacted by the ethics
establishment, a complex and increasingly obscure rule structure
57. 1 HENRY FIELDING, An Essay on the Knowledge of the Characters of Men,
in MISCELLANIES BY HENRY FIELDING, ESQ. 153, 154 (Henry Knight Miller ed.,
Wesleyan Univ. Press 1972) (1743), quoted in MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note
1, at 17.
58. See MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 39-40.
59. See id. at 40.
60. See id. at 41.
61. See id.
62. By this I am referring to the "explosion" of appearance-based ethical rules
following Watergate. See id. at 70-71.
63. See id. at 74.
64. See id. at 73.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 74.
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has emerged.67  "Ethics is in danger of becoming an elaborate
legalistic ritual, in which the application of multi-part tests
substitutes for the internalization of values .. .,,6' And for the
average citizen who, despite the great hue and cry for ethical
reform, sees business as usual, the result is disillusionment and
cynicism.69 Nevertheless, new and increasingly elaborate rules of
ethics continue to be enacted.7 °
For example, although Florida common law had long provided
for sanctions against public officials with conflicts between their
personal interests and public duties, the statutory framework
mandating financial disclosure "is a relative newcomer in Flori-
da. ' ' 71 Critics 72 contend that such disclosure tends to erode the
idea of "trust" contemplated in the Constitution.7 3 According to
Joseph Little, the abolition of financial disclosure "will redirect
resources to more effective means of deterring corruption and bias
in governmental decisionmaking and will reinvigorate the ranks of
governmental officialdom with people of dignity and propriety
"74
Little argues that the Florida financial-disclosure requirements
send a message to candidates and officials that they are not to be
trusted.75 "Such a measure harvests a crop grown from the seeds
it sows. ' ' 76 Accordingly, many of those who expect to be trusted
will take offense to the mistrust and refrain from entering public
life.77 As a consequence of this, Little says financial disclosure is
67. See id. at 98.
68. Id. (quoting CYNTHIA FARINA, ABA COMM. ON GOV'T STANDARDS,
Keeping Faith: Government Ethics and Government Ethics Regulation, 45 ADMIN.
L. REV. 287, 290 (1993)).
69. See id.
70. See Daniel L. Koffsky, Coming to Terms with Bureaucratic Ethics, 11 J.L.
& POL. 235, 236 (1995) ("President Clinton's first Executive Order required his
high-level appointees to pledge obedience to a new set of restrictions on the
activities in which they may engage after leaving the government .... ).
71. Joseph Little, Abolishing Financial Disclosure to Improve Government, 16
STETSON L. REV. 633, 642 (1987) (citing Town of Boca Raton v. Rauelerson, 146
So. 576 (Fla. 1933) and Lainhart v. Burr, 38 So. 711 (Fla. 1905)).
72. See infra note 77.
73. See Little, supra note 71, at 633 n.1.
74. Id. at 633.
75. See id. at 634.
76. Id.
77. See id.; see also Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Govern-
ment Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 68 (citing
others who also believe existing ethics restrictions have diminished the govern-
ment's ability to attract qualified candidates).
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"not merely a farce, but is also a slow menace to good govern-
ment.
78
IV. Elements That Discourage Corruption
In addition to specific legal restrictions on conduct, overall
political and constitutional structures may discourage corrupt
activities. Examination of the international community offers
examples of various systems of government, and irrespective of the
system, there seems to be one inescapable fact-corruption is an
inevitable by-product of any government.79
While democracies are well-equipped to combat the conditions
which make corruption possible, no government has eliminated the
practice altogether. The emerging democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe and Latin America, as well as South Africa,
provide examples of countries in different phases of acquiring the
tools which discourage corruption.
A. Brazil
In 1992, former Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello
announced his plan to rejuvenate the economy and reduce
inflation. 0 When the "Piano Collor" was realized, however, the
country was neither invigorated nor prosperous.8 The implemen-
tation of the plan drained public funds, and federal investigations
were hampered.82 Subsequently, other leading members of the
Brazilian government called for the impeachment of President
Collor.83 Curiously, many of these same leaders are believed to
have redirected over $200 million designated for social programs
into "charitable accounts" under their control.8
Brazil, like many other Latin American nations, has only
recently transitioned from a military dictatorship to a democratic-
style government.85 Subsequently, state enterprises and economic
78. Little, supra note 71, at 634.
79. See Nancy Zucker Boswell, Combating Corruption: Focus on Latin
America, 3 SOUTHWESTERN J.L. & TRADE AM. 179, 182 (1996) (citing HERBERT
H. WERLIN, UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD BANK
STAFF 8).
80. See Luigi Manzetti, Economic Reform and Corruption in Latin America,
3 N.-S. ISSUES 1, 6 (1994); Boswell, supra note 79, at 181.
81. See Boswell, supra note 79, at 181.
82. See id. at 181-82.
83. See id. at 182.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 181.
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markets have been privatized, deregulated, and decentralized.86
This change, however, has not eliminated the existence of corrup-
tion in government.87
So what is lacking in Brazil's democratic government? Many
contend that even though the people have reacted to such practices
by calling for the removal of corrupt leaders, the laws which
regulate such immoral behavior are ambiguous, and in most
accounts, ineffective.8" Indeed, even though Brazil enacted the
Rules of Behavior for Public Servants and the Law Against Illicit
Enrichment in 1990, not until recently has the government
indicated that such legislation will be enforced.8 9
Merely enacting laws to control corruption will not suffice.9"
Ultimately, perhaps, the most potent shortcoming of Brazil's
political system may be a combination of factors: the lack of true
public outrage, an ineffective and dependent judicial power, and,
finally, little political incentive to enforce the legislation already in
place.91 Political systems without strong checks and balances on
power are inherently more vulnerable to corruption. As one
scholar notes about the fledgling Latin American democracies,
The main elements to control corruption-judges, legisla-
tors, auditors, and inspectors general who are independent and
have integrity; a free press; a well-informed, activist public; and,
well-paid and trained civil servants-have been weak. Coupled
with the absence of strong political institutions and financial
management systems, this provided the opportunity to manipu-
late the political system . . ..
The entire system of checks and balances on the exercise of power,
including the ability and capacity of a government to enforce its
laws, must exist before corruption in government will diminish.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 183 (citing WERLIN, supra note 79, at 8).
89. See id. at 186.
90. As Herbert Werlin noted about Peru, laws there "flow from the President
and government departments that conceive them ... with no interference, no
debate, no criticism, and often enough, without the knowledge of those affected
by them." "[T]his results in a dualistic system, in which an 'informal system' of
bribery is used to get around the complex and expensive formal legal system.
Consequently, corruption may have even worsened with the democratization
process that began in 1985." WERLIN, supra note 79, at 22, 20, quoted in Boswell,
supra note 79, at 183.
91. See George Henry Millard, Drugs and Corruption in Latin America, 15
DICK. J. INT'L L. 533, 542 (1997).
92. Boswell, supra note 79, at 183.
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It should be mentioned that while President Collor did step
down, the democracy of Brazil has survived and continues to
progress. With every passing year, Brazil moves away from the
dictators and military control which ruled her past, bringing an
increased awareness among judges and prosecutors there that
effective enforcement of anti-corruption laws is a crucial element
to successfully completing the transition to democracy.93
B. South Africa's Unique Position
In a 1996 survey of South Africans, over fifty-five percent of
those questioned believed that people in government work in their
own interest rather than in the public's interest.94 Furthermore,
129 South African companies responded to a 1995 survey, reporting
that over R5.2 million (approximately $1.5 million) worth of
kickbacks, bribes, and secret commissions occurred during that
year.95
Many contend that the emergence of a new democracy in
South Africa has supported conditions necessary for government
corruption, including Lala Camerer, who notes, "Corruption is
likely to spread in periods of transition from authoritarian rule to
democracy for various reasons, including vacuums of authority,
conflicts of values and a new elite attempting to catch up with the
old. , 96
Moreover, Sahr John Kpundeh warns, "Democratization makes
the public aware of corruption, but at the same time may further
the institutionalization of corruption." 97  Kpundeh explains that
three main factors combine to feed political corruption in many
African countries: the lack of autonomous institutions to control
corruption, an ineffective system of checks and balances resulting
from a one-party system, and centralization of the decision-making
process.98 Installing a democratic-style government may provide
the appearance of legitimacy, but without the active inclusion of the
citizenry, official abuse will continue."
93. See id. at 179-80.
94. See Lala Camerer, South Africa: Derailing the Gravy Train-Controlling
Corruption, 4 J. FIN. CRIME 364, 365 (1997).
95. See id.
96. Id. at 366.
97. Sahr John Kpundeh, Remarks on Kleptocracy and Democracy, in 90 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 95, 97 (1996).
98. See id. at 96.
99. See id. at 97.
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In South Africa, the new democratic system has not been
characterized as exhibiting political competition. l°" The resultant
lack of scrutiny and accountability tend to allow corruption. If a
truly effective multi-party system develops, and the democracy
continues to evolve, then the existence of these protections against
corruption should begin to minimize its incidence in that country.
C. Central and Eastern Europe's New Dilemma
Only last year did Poland's national prosecution chief, Henryk
Pracki, declare that the Polish government is helpless against
corruption.' The head prosecutor stated that corruption among
Polish officials had reached such an alarming point that Western
countries dealing with Poland regard these pay-offs as "business
costs.1
10 2
Poland is enduring radical changes in both its political and
economic systems; it has only recently experienced a significant
redevelopment of its tools of democracy,10 3 and the transition
from socialism to capitalism has directly affected the nature of
corruption. As one Polish citizen told me, "Officials used to be
corrupt so they could gain power to get money. Now corruption is
to get money so you can gain power." Naturally, the substitution
of systems, alone, did not extinguish corruption.
Just as with military dictatorships and oligarchies, socialist
governments have corruption. The systemic corruption now within
Poland's government may be attributed to the norms created by
past regimes.1" As one observer notes, "Where there is systemic
100. For example, in the 1994 parliamentary election, the African National
Congress won approximately sixty-two percent of the seats. See Bill Keller,
Mandela Picks Old Comrades to Fill His New Government, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
1994, § 1, at 1. Then in the 1999 election, the A.N.C. nearly captured a two-thirds
majority of the 400-seat Parliament, falling one seat short. See Suzanne Daley,
Winner Almost Takes All, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1999, at A3. "All told, thirteen
parties are to have seats in South Africa's next Parliament, about twice as many
as in 1994, though they will have fourteen fewer seats between them." Id.
101. See National Prosecutor Helpless Against Corruption, Polish Press Agency
News Wire, May 7, 1998, available in Westlaw, 1998 WL 9729990.
102. See id.
103. See Mark F. Brzezinski, Constitutional Heritage and Renewal: The Case of
Poland, 77 VA. L. REv. 49, 103 (1991). Brzezinski provides a comprehensive
account of Poland's progression from a once democratic system of government, to
a Communist system, and finally into its current democracy. The work traces
Poland's development strictly in terms of its constitution and the effect of changes
in that document.
104. Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel Kaufman, Corruption and Development, FIN. &
DEV., Mar. 1998, at 7, available in Westlaw, 1998 WL 12034515.
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corruption, the institutions, rules, and norms of behavior have
already been adapted to a corrupt modus operandi, with bureau-
crats and other agents often following the predatory examples of,
or even taking instructions from, their principals in the political
arena."' 5  Corruption is actually more difficult to identify and
punish now because of rapid change and new laws and institutions.
Poland must develop the kinds of ethics laws and rules well-
suited to the forms of corruption accompanying capitalism. As a
people, the Poles had only a relatively brief experience with
socialism,"° and reformers suggest energies be focused on in-
creased citizen involvement and careful drafting to close gaps and
resolve ambiguities in the legal system. In fact, fighting corruption
appears easier in Poland than in other countries transitioning from
socialism, such as Russia, because of the overt commitment to
citizen involvement and democratic principles of free press and free
speech.
Lessons derived from these countries' experiences emphasize
that the mere enactment of democratic institutions is insufficient to
deter corruption. The normally unstable transition to democracy
creates opportunities for corruption, even inadvertently. What is
needed is a citizenry energized to participate in and demand ethical
governance, as well as competitive political parties and elections.
New laws must be drafted carefully to deal with new conditions.
And perhaps most importantly, these laws must be enforced
through a steadfast public will and competent institutions.
V. What is Lacking?
Whatever the legal restrictions or political structures, human
beings ultimately serve as the citizens' agents in public service,
which can be seen as a fiduciary relationship. Looking once again
to public office as "a trust,"10 7 an analogy can be made to the
law's imposition of a fiduciary duty on certain relationships where
one party stands in a position of trust relative to another.
108
Ethical reform must do more than merely enact rules to
eliminate the temptations of and opportunities for immoral
behavior. It must encourage people of integrity to participate in
government. Burke stated this fundamental truth when he said,
105. Id.
106. See supra note 103.
107. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8; supra note 73.
108. See Clark, supra note 77, at 69.
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"There never was a bad man that had ability for good service."
10 9
Accordingly, if one were to accept Oliver Wendell Holmes' "bad-
man theory"'110 of the law, it is clear that practical ethics reform
requires society to focus on the character of the candidate for
office. The "bad man," according to Holmes, does not concern
himself with the rational or moral underpinnings of the law; he is
concerned only with the parameters it sets for him."' The theory
thus lends itself to the notion that rules of ethics by themselves do
not encourage moral public service; they merely mandate compli-
ance.
Thus the heart of the problem is, as it always has been, a
conflict between philosophies of law." 2  Positivism reigns in
modern society, but we refuse to completely turn away from the
lessons of natural law. Martin Luther King once said, "An unjust
law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal and natural law.
... Any law that degrades human personality is unjust." '1 13 It
would follow then, that from a natural-law perspective, a public
officer is justified in refusing to comply with the law while in
pursuit of moral public service.
The Greek philosophers concerned themselves "with the
virtues of character, the traits that underlie or explain a disposition
to act in the right way," rather than standards of conduct. 114 In
line with this philosophy is the belief that people's actions "de-
pend[] first and foremost upon their character, not on any knowl-
edge of moral or legal rules that they might possess." '15 Conse-
109. Edmund Burke, Impeachment of Warren Hastings (1788), quoted in JOHN
BARTLETT, BARTLETT's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 373 (Emily Morrison Beck ed.,
15th ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1980).
110. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,460-
61 (1897).
111. See Peter Berkowitz, On the Laws Governing Free Spirits and Philosophers
of the Future: A Response to Nonet's "What is Positive Law?", 100 YALE L. J. 701,
703-04 (1990).
112. See id. at 702 (citing PLATO, MINOS 314c, 315a, 321b, in THE ROOTS OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 53, 54-55, 56, 66 (Thomas L. Pangle trans., ed., 1987)).
Socrates once asked, "What is law (nomos)?" In the Republic, an issue of critical
importance was whether justice is "whatever the strongest declare it to be," or
whether it is natural, independent of what society chooses. See id.
113. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from the Birmingham City Jail (1963),
in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE 289 (J. Washington ed., 1986), quoted in Berkowitz,
supra note 111, at 703.




quently, in order to achieve ethical governance, perhaps we should
first analyze the essence of virtuous character.
Has, in fact, the zeal for legalistic remedies to ethical and
moral questions driven individuals of good character away from
public service? Some commentators think so. 1 6 Their theory is
that sufficient emphasis is not placed on the importance and
honorable nature of public service. Rather, the new goal is
bureaucratic compliance.
Others point to the emergence of "bureaucratic ethics" reform,
a system whereby a comprehensive set of rules and procedures
aimed at preventing conflicts between the private interests of
government workers and their public duties, as the cause of what
currently ails government ethics.117  Apparently, such reform
causes government employees to view their duty to avoid conflicts
of interest "as a matter of achieving formalistic compliance rather
than serving the public good." ''1 While compliance is obviously
a virtue, so is creativity and an overriding desire to do the public
good, even when doing good may require challenging the system.
A quandary as difficult to resolve as over-legislated ethical
restrictions are those public officials' transgressions that, while not
illegal, are considered immoral. The conflict between positive and
natural law is once again implicated. Even if we ignore any legal
transgressions, are private acts which are deemed immoral
debilitating to effective public service? Regardless, even if no legal
issue is raised, the political consequences of immoral behavior can
be devastating.
Ethical governance must be based on more than minimal legal
compliance. This is because good government requires vision,
energy, and character in addition to bureaucratic compliance. The
normal chaos of pluralistic democratic systems requires moral
leadership for stability. This suggests that our societies and
educational systems must inculcate values and the importance of
morality in public service, as our educational systems provide the
fundamental opportunity to deliver the message to the next
generation: Public service is a high calling.
116. See supra note 77.
117. See Koffsky, supra note 70, at 235.
118. Id.
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VI. Conclusion
There is an understandable urge to eliminate all corruption.
"Yet at some point the costs of vigilance outweigh the bene-
fits.""' 9 As much as we are spurred by scandals to enact laws and
jail thieves, we will never have a perfect government. 2 1 In other
words, corruption will always be with us.
Some conclusions from general experience can be reached.
First, democracy and its attendant open institutions deter corrup-
tion better than any other system. Second, a series of significant
deterrents -frequent elections, competitive political parties, an
independent judiciary, a free press, free speech, and an involved
citizenry-combine to deter corruption by creating an environment
hostile to it.
Even with these characteristics, though, democratic systems
need effective laws and the institutions to vigorously enforce those
laws. While older democracies successfully reduce corruption in
government, corruption remains a threat to those newly born.
They need to develop mature political and law-enforcement
systems to fight corruption effectively.
The definition of ethical governance remains vexatious. It is
quite possible to define moral and ethical government using
impossibly high or illogical standards; that is, however, not our
purpose. Instead, our purpose is to recognize that certain laws and
institutions deter and curtail corrupt practices and to recognize that
an ethical, effective government should be something more than
governance in the absence of corruption.
Along with a duty to deter bad government, there is a duty to
encourage good government and public service by good and ethical
people. As discussed above, some believe that the torrent of
reform legislation, much of it requiring increased disclosure of
private concerns, discourages good people from entering the glass
house of public service. Have the watch dogs become Peeping
Toms?
Whether reform laws are a deterrent or not, in many democra-
cies the positive incentive for public service seems wanting. While
the Hellenistic and Platonic concepts are idealistic, we are foolish
119. MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at xi.
120. See 1 EDWARD GIBBON, HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
ROMAN EMPIRE ch. 21 at 706 (Modern Library 1932) (1776) ("Corruption, the
most infallible symptom of constitutional liberty .... ).
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to believe that the quality of laws can replace the quality of people
in public service. We need public servants who serve after
checking with their conscience rather than consulting with their
lawyer. As Edmund Burke said, "It is not, what a lawyer tells me
I may do; but what humanity, reason, and justice, tell me I ought
to do.
' 1 21
121. Edmund Burke, Second Speech on Conciliation with America (1775),
quoted in BARTLETt, supra note 109, at 372 (emphasis in original).
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APPENDIX A
Rules of Ethics in Florida
I. Misuse of Public Position:
A. "No public officer, employee of an agency, or local
government attorney shall corruptly use or attempt to use his or
her official position or any property or resource which may be
within his or her trust, or perform his or her official duties, to
secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself,
or others. 1
22
B. For purposes of this section, "corruptly" is defined to mean
"done with a wrongful intent and for the purpose of obtaining, or
compensating or receiving compensation for, any benefit resulting
from some act or omission of a public servant which is inconsistent
with the proper performance of his or her public duties.
12 1
II. Gifts:
The following reveals some of the subtle differences in this
area:
A. "No public officer, employee of an agency, local govern-
ment attorney, or candidate for nomination or election shall solicit
or accept anything of value to the recipient... based upon any
understanding that the... [recipient] would be influenced there-
by. 112
4
B. "A reporting individual... is prohibited from soliciting any
gift from a political committee or ... a lobbyist .... ,125
C. "A reporting individual... is prohibited from knowingly
accepting, directly or indirectly, a gift from a political committee
or . . . from a lobbyist ... if he or she knows or reasonably believes
that the gift has a value in excess of $100; however, such a gift may
be accepted by such person on behalf of a governmental entity or
a charitable organization. '
122. FLA. STAT. § 112.313(6).
123. FLA. STAT. § 112.312(9).
124. FLA. STAT. § 112.313(2) (emphasis added).
125. FLA. STAT. § 112.3148(3) (emphasis added).
126. FLA. STAT. § 112.3148(4) (emphasis added).
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D. "Each reporting individual ... shall file a state-
ment ... containing a list of gifts which he or she believes to be in
excess of $100 ....,,127
E. "The value of a gift provided to a reporting individu-
al ... shall be determined using actual cost to the donor, less taxes
and gratuities ....,128
F. "Food and beverages which are not consumed at a single
sitting or meal and which are provided on the same calendar day
shall be considered a single gift, and the total value of all food and
beverages provided on that date shall be considered the value of
the gift. 12
9
1II. Doing Business with One's Agency:
"No ... public officer acting in his or her official capacity,
shall either directly or indirectly purchase, rent, or lease any realty,
goods, or services for his or her own agency from any business
entity of which the officer ... or the officer's . . . spouse or child
is an officer, partner, director, or proprietor ...."'
IV. Conflicting Employment or Contractual Relationship:
"No public officer. .. shall have or hold any employment or
contractual relationship with any business entity or agency which
is subject to the regulation of, or is doing business with, an agency
of which he or she is an officer or employee ....131
V. Financial Disclosure:
In Florida, financial disclosure is a two-tiered system, although
disclosure is not duplicitous:
No person who is required, pursuant to s. 8, Art. II of the
State Constitution, to file a full and public disclosure of
financial interests and who has filed a full and public disclosure
of financial interests for any calendar or fiscal year shall be
required to file a statement of financial interests pursuant to s.
127. FLA. STAT. § 112.3148(8)(a).
128. FLA. STAT. § 112.3148(7)(a).
129. FLA. STAT. § 112.3148(7)(f).
130. FLA. STAT. § 112.313(3).
131. FLA. STAT. § 112.313(7).
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112.3145(2) and (3) for the same year or for any part thereof
notwithstanding any requirement of this part ....
A. Statutory Financial Disclosure:
Florida law requires specified individuals to file a "statement
of financial interests,' ' 13  to include:
1. "All sources of income in excess of five percent of the gross
income received during the disclosure period by the person in his
or her own name or by any other person for his or her use or
benefit, excluding public salary. ... The person reporting shall list
such sources in descending order of value with the largest source
first. 
' 134
2. "All sources of income to a business entity in excess of ten
percent of the gross income of a business entity in which the
reporting person held a material interest and from which he or she
received an amount which was in excess of ten percent of his or her
gross income during the disclosure period and which exceeds
$1,500. 15135
3. "The location or description of real property in this state,
except for residences and vacation homes, owned directly or
indirectly by the person reporting, when such person owns in excess
of five percent of the value of such real property, and a general
description of any intangible personal property worth in excess of
ten percent of such person's total assets. For the purposes of this
paragraph, indirect ownership does not include ownership by a
spouse or minor child."'
136
4. "Every liability which in sum equals more than the
reporting person's net worth.,
137
B.Constitutional "Full and Public" Financial Disclosure:
Full and public disclosure of financial interests shall mean
filing with the secretary of state by July 1 of each year a sworn
statement showing net worth and identifying each asset and
liability in excess of $1,000 and its value together with the
following:
a. A copy of the person's most recent federal income tax
return; or
132. FLA. STAT. § 112.3144(1).
133. FLA. STAT. § 112.3145(3).
134. FLA. STAT. § 112.3145(3)(a) (emphasis added).
135. FLA. STAT. § 112.3145(3)(b) (emphasis added).
136. FLA. STAT. § 112.3145(3)(c) (emphasis added).
137. FLA. STAT. § 112.3145(3)(d) (emphasis added).
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b. A sworn statement which identifies each separate
source and amount of income which exceeds $1,000.138
138. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(h)(1).
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